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Abstract
We investigate the model of Froot and Stein (1998), a model that has very strong implications
for risk management. We argue that their conclusions are too strong and need to be qualiﬁed.
Also, there are some unusual consequences of their model, which may be linked to the chosen
pricing formula.
1 Introduction
A number of models have been developed to characterize the optimal risk selection strategy for
ﬁnancial institutions. One particularly celebrated model is due to Froot, Scharfstein and Stein
(1993) and Froot and Stein (1998), henceforth FSS and FS. FS won the best paper award in the
Journal of Financial Economics in 1998.
Together these articles present a model using shareholder value as a measure to rate diﬀerent
strategies in a near-perfect market. FSS introduces a model of the dynamics of the hedging position
along with future ﬁnancing and investment opportunities. One basic element of this model is that
the company has some technological advantage allowing a higher return on capital than the market
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1would oﬀer, although this advantage levels oﬀ as a function of capital. FS includes the dynamics of
the market into this set-up allowing a valuation of a company in the market. One major conclusion
of these articles is that the production technology of a company should not be exposed to ﬁnancial
risk at all if the company operates with the shareholders’ interest at heart [see FS, Proposition 1
page 63 and Proposition 2 page 64]. Of course, these papers address more general issues like the
overall capital budgeting and allocation decisions of companies, but much of the precise conclusions
rely on these earlier results.
The FS result implies that, for example, in the insurance industry underwriting is what creates
value, not exposure to ﬁnancial risks. While this point of view is gaining acceptance in the insurance
industry, it certainly was not reﬂected in the practical strategies observed throughout the 1990’s, see
Hancock, Huber and Koch (2001) The consequence of FS, i.e., shunning all ﬁnancial exposure, has
generated a lot of interest in the insurance industry due to its huge implications for the practical
management of that industry.
The FS approach makes use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model - henceforth the CAPM - for
pricing risk, and of the empirically well-documented facts that payoﬀ is marginally decreasing in the
capital invested, and that capital does not ﬂow frictionlessly in market. Most ﬁnancial analysts agree
upon the assumptions in the FS approach separately. What Froot and Stein have done is to combine
the three assumptions in one model and draw some strong conclusions.
From an academic point of view, the FS conclusion seems too strong. Should companies really
never invest in stocks no matter what the relationship is between the risk premium and the volatility
of stocks? Larger volatility ceteris paribus makes it less favorable for the ﬁrm to invest in stocks
relative to what an individual can obtain by himself, because the ﬁrm loses out more eventually.
On the other hand, a larger risk premium should ceteris paribus make it more favorable for the
ﬁrm to invest in stocks relative to what an individual can obtain by himself, because of the ﬁrm’s
technological advantage. There is a trade-oﬀ between risk and return for the ﬁrm as for an individual
except there is an extra element of loss aversion to the ﬁrm. It is not clear though that this should
lead to the total hedging outcome found by FS.
In this note we show that the main results of FS [Proposition 1 and 2] are incorrect as stated.
First, an additional condition on market parameters is needed to ensure that the perfect hedging
strategy is a local maximum rather than a local minimum in the bank’s optimization problem. This
condition is that the Sharpe ratio of the market return be less than one, i.e., the risk premium be
less than the standard deviation. When that condition is violated, it is optimal to hold some stocks.
2Empirically, we perhaps expect to see Sharpe ratios less than one, at least for long horizons and for
usual market indices. Using 100 years of data, Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002) obtain numbers
in the 0.1-0.4 range. On the other hand, Lo (2002) points to some issues in the construction of
the Sharpe ratio and ﬁnds some funds producing Sharpe ratios over one. So this case is empirically
relevant. Second, we show that even when the necessary condition for perfect hedging to be a local
maximum is satisﬁed, the globally optimal strategy can be quite diﬀerent, and can be nonsensical.
This is best understood as a nasty side eﬀect of the implicit linearization used by the authors in
solving the model. Although one can ap o s t e r i o r irule this nasty outcome out, the existence of such
a black hole questions the validity of the approach.
2 The Froot and Stein Model
The FS model has three periods. In the ﬁrst period the ﬁrm chooses its capital structure, in the
second period it chooses its ﬁnancial investments/hedging position. In the ﬁnal period, the ﬁrm
realizes its ﬁnancial investments and then invests the proceeds plus some external ﬁnancing in a
subsequent project. This project has concave payoﬀ to the total investment. The external ﬁnancing
carries convex costs. Our objective is to analyze the hedging position, so we don’t consider any ‘new
products’ as they did. We focus on just two time periods, 0 and 1, and two decisions: the hedging
decision and the external ﬁnancing decision.1
Assumption 1. Let at time 0 the company’s internal capital be K,a n dl e ti tb ee x p o s e dt oa n
initial risk, which at time 1 will generate capital w,w h e r ew is a non-degenerate random variable
with known distribution at time 0.
One could think of w as the underwriting plus investment result for an insurance company. At
time 1 the company receives capital w, now holding the realized internal capital I = K ·(1−τ)+w,
where τ is a deadweight cost for holding K between time 0 and time 1, which could be, for example,
taxes.
In the ﬁnal period there are investment opportunities
Assumption 2. Denote by F(I) the NPV at time 1 of present and future cash ﬂows in the
company. Let F be given by F(I)=f(I) −I, where f(I),at h r i c ed i ﬀerentiable function, known at
time 0, is the PV at time 1 of the present and future cashﬂows. Let f0 ≥ 1 and f00 ≤ 0. Also assume
that f(0) = 0.
1We do not analyze the capital selection issue as do FS.
3Funding of investments can be achieved by raising external capital at time 1 to cover a shortfall
in the internal capital, i.e., when w comes out low.
Assumption 3. Assume that the company at time 1 can raise capital e ≥ 0 by repaying in the
future an amount with PV of C(e)+e,w h e r eC is a thrice diﬀerentiable function with C(0) = 0,
C0 ≥ 0,a n dC00 > 0.
T h i sm e a n st h a ti ti sp r o p o r t i o n a l l ym o r ee x p e n sive to loan larger amounts than smaller ones,
and that it is a negative NPV transaction. This assumption states that external funding is not
frictionless for a company. Deﬁne
W = K · (1 − τ)+w,
then the level of internal capital after external funding I is I = W + e. The PV and NPV of the
company at time 1 are, respectively: f(I)+(−C(e)−e) and f(I)−I+(−C(e)−e)+e = F(I)−C(e).
The company’s problem in the ﬁnal period is to derive the optimal external funding, i.e., maximize
the NPV at time 1 by solving the following optimization problem:
max
e F(I) − C(e) subject to W = K · (1 − τ)+w,
I = W + e, e ≥ 0.
There exists a unique solution to this optimization problem, and the solution is described by a value
function P(W). It retains the same properties as F, namely it is concave and increasing, as argued
in FSS. A proof of this can be found in Høgh (2003, Lemma 6). If P is concave, the marginal return
on investments must be decreasing, and the optimal level of investments must be increasing in the
level of internal capital W.
In the ﬁrst period the ﬁrm has to decide on its hedging policy based on its valuation of the payoﬀs
at this earlier time. The outcome w is composed of tradable and non-tradable risks
Assumption 4. Assume that w can be expressed as w = wT +wN, where wT is tradable and wN
is non-tradable in the market. Assume that wN is normal distributed containing only non-systematic
risk, and that wT is the ﬁnancial exposure. The trading choice set consists of just the market portfolio
with return rM and the risk free asset with return R only so that
w
T = w
T(α)=V · [1 + (α · rM +( 1− α) · R)],
where V is the total value invested at time 0.
The stochastic variable wN represents the part of the risk in the company’s production technology
for which there exists no combination of tradeable assets that fully or partially hedges that risk. Note
4that W = W(α)=wN +wT(α)+K ·(1−τ) is a function of the scalar α. This parameter represents
the hedging decision that has to be chosen so as to maximize the present value of the ﬁrm at time 0.
The FS analysis is divided in two main arguments. First, FS say: “without any real loss of
generality, we can assume that prices are determined by a simple one-factor model”, i.e., the CAPM
can be invoked to imply that the present value PV of P, where P is the NPV function at time 1, is
PV = Q(α), where (1)
Q(α)=
E(P(W)) − γ · cov(P(W),r M)
1+R
,






Second, they conclude that Q has a single optimum at α =0 . They interpret this as implying the
following [FS, pp63-64]:
Proposition FS. The ﬁrm will always wish to fully hedge its exposure to any tradeable risks.
This is perhaps the main mathematical result of their paper, and is extremely strong and far
reaching.2 In Theorem 1 below we show that this proposition is not correct. We show that the
optimal value for Q is not always α =0 . This value can be a local maximum when certain conditions
on the distribution of the risky asset holds, but when those conditions do not hold it can even be
a (local) minimum. In such cases there can be a local maximum at some positive α. In addition,
Sometimes one even gets the implausible outcome that the global maximum occurs at α = −∞.
3 The Main Result





We can now state the following result, which is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 1. Suppose that P is a thrice diﬀerentiable function. Then the ﬁrst derivative of











var(rM)E(rM − R). (2)
2The remaining analysis of the FS paper, like choice of capital and ‘new products’ relies on this result quite heavily.
5(i) If E[P00(W)] < 0, then α =0is a local maximum for Q if sM < 1 or a local minimum for
Q if sM > 1.







V · E(rM − R)
. (3)
Proposition 1 says that the critical point α =0 ,i . e . ,t h ep o i n tw h e r eW contains no systematic
risk, is not always even a local maximum. Whether α =0is a maximum or a minimum does not
depend on the technology (i.e., P) at all, but does depend on the prospect of the market, speciﬁcally
on whether sM < 1 or sM > 1. When sM > 1, the value α =0is actually a minimum contrary
to FS. In that case, there can be a local maximum at some b α>0, provided E[P000(W)]|α=b α > 0,
which can be expected for an increasing and concave function. The precise location of the solution
b α, when b α 6=0 , depends on the technology through P. A risk averse individual would always seek
some positive investment in risky assets, whereas the FS ﬁrm sometimes does and sometimes does
not invest in risky assets, with the decision hinging on the prospect of the market. Finally, even if
sM < 1 and α =0is a local maximum, α =0m a ys t i l ln o tb et h eg l o b a lm a x i m u ma sw es h o wi n
the following example.
Example 1. Suppose that P(W) is given by
P(W)=−β1 · e
−β2·W + β3, β1 > 0, β2 > 0,
which is consistent with the model of section 2. Then the relation between E[P00(W)] and E[P000(W)]




2·e−β2·W. This implies that
−β2 · E[P00(W)] = E[P000(W)] 6=0 . Therefore, for sM < 1, α =0is a local minimum for Q(α),a n d
for sM > 1 > 0, α =0is a local maximum. The solution to equation (3), i.e., b α 6=0,i sd e t e r m i n e d
by V , β2 and the market parameters only, since equation (3) in this case is equal to




var(rM) − [E(rM) − R]2
var(rM) · E(rM − R)
=: a.
There is one critical point diﬀerent from α =0for Q(α).F o r V> 0,E (rM) >R ,a n dP(W)=





Figure 1. The function Q(α) for Example 1. In the ﬁrst case, sM < 1, while the second case has sM > 1.
The Q function attains its global maximum at α = −∞. If one also assumes that (1) holds as
do FS, i.e., that Q = PV, this says that the ﬁrm should borrow an inﬁnite amount at the rate of
return of the market portfolio and invest in the rate of return of the risk free asset. If the company
chooses to borrow a nearly inﬁnite amount at the rate of return of the market portfolio and lend a
nearly inﬁnite amount at the rate of return of the risk free asset, then the resulting expected return is
nearly −∞,s i n c eE(rM) ≥ R. This seems like an unrealistic consequence. Why does this occur? We
think that a possible explanation of this anomaly lies with the assumption that PV(P)=Q, which
leads to a logical inconsistency. When we transform a symmetric random variable W by a concave
transformation P, the random variable P(W) can’t be symmetrically distributed. The CAPM can’t
b ea p p l i e dt ob o t hp a y o ﬀs W and P(W).
4C o n c l u s i o n
In the late 1990s’ large returns on ﬁnancial investments resulted in the insurance industry exposing
itself to large ﬁnancial risk and to cash ﬂow underwriting. The economic approach to the valuation of
7companies introduced by FS apparently suggests a clear direction the insurance industry needs to go
to improve the shareholder outcome, see Hancock, Huber and Koch (2001). It is therefore unfortunate
that the analysis in the innovative paper FS is not fully correct. We suggest two possible paths to
follow. One could extend the two-moments CAPM to a three moments CAPM, thereby eliminating
t h es y s t e m a t i ce r r o rm a d ew h e nu s i n gt h et w om o m e n t sC A P Mt o g e t h e rw i t ht h eP(W),s i n c et h e r e
no longer are any restrictions distribution-wise on P. Or one could use arbitrage pricing theory like
Black-Scholes to ﬁnd the present value of P instead. Either way, the conclusions are likely to be much
less strong, and whether some net investment in stocks is the optimal strategy is likely to depend on
model parameters.
5 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .By the CAPM applied to W, Stein’s Lemma [Cochrane (2001, pp164-
165)], and interchanging diﬀerentiation and integration, the ﬁrst derivative of (1 + R) · PV{P(W)}

















0(W)] · V · α · E(rM − R)]
= E[P
0(W) · V · (rM − R)]
−E[P
00(W) · V · (rM − R)] · V · α · E(rM − R)
−E[P
0(W)] · V · E(rM − R)
= V




00(W) · (rM − R)] · α · E(rM − R)
= V
2 · α · E[P
00(W)] · var(rM)
−V
2 · α · E(rM − R)
·[E[P
000(W)] · cov(W,rM)+E[P
00(W)] · E(rM − R)]
= V
2 · α · E[P





000(W)] · var(rM) · E(rM − R).
This is as stated in (2). Clearly, α =0is a critical point.











> 0 if ∆ < 0 and E[P00(W)]|α=0 < 0
=0 if ∆ =0and E[P00(W)]|α=0 =0
< 0 if ∆ > 0 and E[P00(W)]|α=0 < 0,
(4)
9where ∆ =v a r ( rM) − [E(rM) − R]2. Critical points diﬀerent from zero solve the equation
b α =
E[P00(W)]|α=b α
V · E[P000(W)]|α=b α
·
var(rM) − [E(rM) − R]2
var(rM) · E(rM − R)
,
which is as stated in (3) on dividing through.
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